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COMMENTS
MOBILE HOME FINANCING UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
Steven J. Harman
Soaring construction costs have made mobile homes an inex-
pensive alternative for potential home owners. As a result, lending
institutions are awakening to the need for mobile home financing,
and lawyers, representing the lenders, are awakening to the Uniform
Commercial Code.' This comment explains how to secure the maxi-
mum Code protection for the financer.
THE MECHANICS OF CREATING AND PERFECTING A SECURITY INTEREST
Classify the Collateral
The first step to create a security interest under the Code is to
classify the collateral. "Collateral" is any property, either personal
or a fixture, subject to a security interest.2 Selection of the proper
classification for the collateral is extremely important, because the
classification determines the method of perfecting the security in-
terest.3
Mobile homes are "goods" within the meaning of Code section
87A-9-105(1)(f). "'Goods' includes all things which are movable at
the time the security interest attaches or which are fixtures . .."
Section 87A-9-109 classifies goods into four major categories: (1)
consumer goods, (2) inventory, (3) farm products, and (4) equip-
ment. These classifications are mutually exclusive, 5 which means
that the same goods cannot be both consumer goods and inventory
in the hands of the same person. Goods can, however, be consumer
goods in one person's hands and inventory in another's.6 Generally,
it is the use to which the owner puts the goods which determines
the classification. 7
1. REvisED CODES OF MONTANA, tit. 87A (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947].
Mobile home financing involves a ". . . transaction . . which is intended to create a secu-
rity interest in personal property or fixtures ... ." Thus, chapter 9 of the Code applies.
R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-102(a).
2. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-105(1)(c).
3. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-302.
4. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-105(1)(f).
5. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-109, Comment 2 (1962 version) [hereinafter cited as
U.C.C.]. The "farm products" classification is not relevant here and so is not considered.
6. U.C.C. § 9-109, Comment 2 (1962 version).
7. U.C.C. § 9-109, Comment 2 (1962 version).
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Other relevant classifications include motor vehicles in section
87A-9-302(1)(d) and fixtures in 87A-9-313. These classes are ex-
tremely significant when determining how to perfect a security in-
terest in mobile homes, and will be considered separately.
A. Consumer Goods
A "good is a consumer good if [it] is used or bought for use
primarily for personal, family or household purposes." 8 On first
impression, a mobile home purchased for use as a family dwelling
would appear to be a consumer good. However, not all authorities
agree with this classification, and at least one case, In re Sprague,'
has specifically rejected it. In Sprague, a secured party asserted that
since a mobile home was a consumer good, a financing statement
need not be filed to perfect his security interest. 0 The referee re-
jected this contention, reasoning:
The legislature by adopting the term "consumer goods" can-
not be inferred to have intended to "include all things which are
movable at the time the security interest attaches," UCC § 9-
105(1)(f), when purchased primarily for personal, family or house-
hold purposes UCC § 9-109(1) as there would have been no necess-
ity for the use of the word "consumer."
"Consumer" is used as a limitation and must be applied in its
ordinary sense...
Webster's New World Dictionary defines consume i.e., "to use
up, eat, waste, destroy," and consumer i.e., "a person or thing that
destroys, uses up or wastes something" and the items intended to
fall under the purview of the UCC § 9-109(1) definition must be
construed to be those which would logically fall under the ordinary
definition of the term "consume" and "consumer." I cannot hold
that the item in question so falls.'
The referee concluded that the mobile home was a motor vehicle
under the Code and therefore filing was required to perfect the
8. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-109(1).
9. In re Sprague, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 702 (Ref. Dec. N.D. N.Y. 1966).
10. McKINNEY'S CONSOLIDATED LAws OF NEW YORK ANNOTATED, bk. 62V2 pt. 3, § 9-302
(1964) provides:
(1) A financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests except the
following
(d) a purchase money interest in consumer goods; but filing is required to perfect
such a security interest in a motor vehicle required to be licensed or registered in
this state, and a filing in the place specified in paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of
Section 9-401 is required to perfect, for the purposes of Section 9-313 only, such a
security interest in a fixture;
11. In re Sprague, supra note 9 at 705, 706.
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secured party's interest. Some writers have criticized the referee's
rationale, fearing future ad hoc decisions rejecting consumer goods
as a classification for other types of collateral. 3 Consequently, a
mobile home financer should be cautious in selecting consumer
goods as a classification.
B. Inventory
If a person holds mobile homes for sale or lease they constitute
"inventory."" Should an investment company floor plan an individ-
ual's stock of mobile homes, it would secure itself by taking a secu-
rity interest in "inventory."' 5
C. Equipment
A mobile home constitutes "equipment" if it is used or bought
for use primarily in business (including farming or a profession), or
by a debtor who is a non-profit organization, or by a governmental
subdivision or agency.' Further, the "equipment" classification
functions as a classification catch-all: if an item is not classified as
"inventory," "farm products" or "consumer goods," it is "equip-
ment." 7 For example, a contractor purchasing a mobile home for
use as a bunk house on job sites holds the collateral as equipment.
D. Fixtures
Fixtures are "goods" under the Code and constitute a separate
12. Id. at 707. Accord, In re Vinarsky, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 707 (Ref. Dec. N.D. N.Y.
1966), aff'd 287 F.Supp. 446, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1042 (N.D. N.Y. 1968); In re Radny, 12
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 583 (Ref. Dec. W.D. Mich. 1973); Albany Discount Corp. v. Mohawk Nat'l
Bank, 54 Misc.2d 238, 282 N.Y.S.2d 401, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 669 (Sup. Ct. 1967), aff'd 30
App. Div.2d 919, 292 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1968), aff'd 28 N.Y.2d 222,269 N.E.2d 809, 321 N.Y.S.2d
94, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1310 (1971).
Maine has classified a mobile home as a consumer good. In re Williams, 10 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 277 (Ref. Dec. D. Me. 1971); In re Pelletier, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 327 (Ref. Dec. D. Me.
1968). Maine's Code, however differs significantly from those of New York and Michigan,
Maine has deleted section 9-302(1)(d) requiring a filing as to motor vehicles (see, note 10
supra), and Maine requires a financing statement be filed to perfect a security interest in
consumer goods. MAINE RmvsED STATmrEs ANNOTATED, tit. 11, § 9-302 (1964). The Codes of
New York and Michigan include 9-302(1)(d) and do not require a filing to perfect a purchase
money security interest in consumer goods. McKiNNEY's CONsouDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK
ANNOTATED, bk. 62 1/2, pt. 3, § 9-302 (1964); MICMGAN STATUTES ANNOTATED § 19.9302 (1964).
Montana's Code is similar to those of New York and Michigan. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-302.
Thus, it appears Montana courts would rely on New York and Michigan decisions regarding
classification of a mobile home under the Code.
13. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 23-7 (1972).
14. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-109(4).
15. Taylor Mobile Homes v. Founders Investment Corp., 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1363 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
16. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-109(2).
17. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-109(2).
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collateral classification.'" A definition of fixtures is not provided by
the Code but is determined by state law.'9 Should inventory, equip-
ment, consumer goods, or farm products become so attached to the
soil that state law deems them a part of the realty, they are "fix-
tures." 20 R.C.M. 1947, Section 67-209 defines fixtures as follows:
A thing is deemed to be affixed to land when it is attached to it
by roots, as in the case of trees, vines, or shrubs; or imbedded in
it, as in the case of walls; or permanently resting upon it, as in the
case of buildings; or permanently attached to what is thus perma-
nent as by means of cement, plaster, nails, bolts or screws.2'
Montana has never determined when a mobile home becomes
a fixture.22 But, because of the impact this classification has on
perfection and priorities, analysis of existing Montana fixture law
is helpful.
The Montana supreme court has adopted the following tests to
determine whether an item of personalty becomes a part of the
realty:
(1) Whether what would otherwise be personal property has be-
come a fixture by reason of its attachment to the soil is primarily
a question of intention on the part of the person attaching it; (2)
the attachment in the manner indicated in our Code sections
above raises a presumption that the one who made the attachment
intended the thing to become a part of the realty; this presumption
however, is a disputable one; (3) as a general rule, the manner in
which the attachment is made, the adaptability of the thing at-
tached to the use to which the realty is applied and the intentions
of the one making the attachment determines whether the thing
attached is realty or personalty."
18. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-105(1)(f).
19. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-313(1).
20. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-313(1).
21. R.C.M. 1947, § 67-209.
22. The Montana supreme court has dealt with mobile homes in other contexts. In
Timmerman v. Gabriel, 155 Mont. 294, 470 P.2d 528 (1970) the court rejected defendant's
contention that his 20 foot by 50 foot trailer placed on a permanent foundation was a perma-
nent home and not a trailer within the meaning of a restrictive covenant excluding "trailers."
In Meccage v. Spartan Ins. Co., 156 Mont. 135, 477 P.2d 115 (1970) an insured contended
that his trailer located on a permanent foundation on his own land, with two rooms built on,
plus connections for sewer, water, power and telephone made it an "improvement" within
the meaning of the "valued policy" statute in Montana. (R.C.M. 1947, § 40-4302). The
insurance company opposed the insured on the basis that the insured should not be allowed
to reap the benefits of paying a personal property tax on his trailer, while claiming it as an
"improvement on real property" within the statute. The court held for the insured stating:
"... the mobile home was clearly affixed to the land in that it rested on a permanent
foundation and was connected to a sewer." Id. at 117.
23. Montana Electric Co. v. Northern Valley Mining Co., 51 Mont. 266, 153 P. 1017,
1018 (1915).
[Vol. 36
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The required subjective intent may be presumed from the "...
character of the chattel, the manner and effect of its annexation, its
adaptability to the use of the realty, the purpose to which it is put,
the relation of the parties, the policy of the law, . and . . . the
provisions of the contract."
2
'
Applying similar tests the Seventh Circuit in George v. Com-
mercial Credit Corp. ,25 has classified a mobile home as a fixture
under the Code. The court considered the following factors as signif-
icant: the mobile home was 14 feet by 68 feet, weighed 15,000
pounds and was connected to a well and septic tank on land owned
by the debtor. Further, it was placed on cement blocks with the
wheels still attached although the debtor had made plans to have
the wheels removed and a permanent foundation built, and it con-
tained six rooms in which the debtor and his wife intended to live
permanently.26
Although George is good law for the facts it considered, it is
important to note that the subjective intent is manifested by the
particular facts of each case which demonstrate the permanent
character of the personalty. For example, in George the mobile
home was affixed to land owned by the homeowner, but it is not
clear whether or not the result would differ if the owner placed the
home on property leased for that purpose.
R.C.M. 1947, Section 67-209 requires that an item of personalty
assume a "permanent" relationship with the land before it can be-
come a fixture. Just how long personalty must remain before it will
be considered permanent was reviewed in Pritchard Petroleum Co.
v. Farmers Co-op:27
'Permanent' does not imply that the annexation must be intended
to be perpetual but rather that the article shall appear to be in-
tended to remain fastened until worn out, until the purpose to
which the realty is devoted has been accomplished, or until the
article is superceded by another article more suitable for the pur-
pose. It appears to be sufficient that it is intended to remain where
placed as long as the land or buildings to which it is annexed may
be used for the same purposes. 28
Thus, where a large platform rested on property leased for one
year with no option to renew, the court determined that it was not
a fixture, noting that the lease gave the platform a temporary rather
24. Shipler v. Potomac Copper Co., 69 Mont. 86, 220 P. 1097, 1100 (1923).
25. George v. Commercial Credit Corp., 440 F.2d 551, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1315 (7th
Cir. 1971).
26. Id. at 553.
27. Pritchard Petroleum Co. v. Farmers Co-op, 117 Mont. 467, 161 P.2d 526 (1945).
28. Id. at 531.
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than permanent character. 9 Perhaps a longer lease would satisfy the
permanency test. Therefore, it appears that a mobile home will be
considered a fixture only where the owner places the home on his
land, on a permanent foundation, connects it to sewer, water, and
other utilities, and indicates that he will live there permanently.
E. Motor Vehicles
"Motor vehicles" constitutes a separate classification of collat-
eral which is significant only when one is perfecting a security inter-
est.10 The term is not defined, in the Code, and must therefore be
defined by statutes outside the Code. Some states rely on definitions
provided in their Motor Vehicle Codes.'
Section 53-104 of Montana's Motor Vehicle Code" defines
motor vehicle as including ". . . trailers, semitrailers, automobiles,
auto trucks, motorcycles, cyclemotors, and all other vehicles pro-
pelled by their own power . . ." Section 53-107 states: "The term
'motor vehicle' includes automobiles, trucks, motorcycles, semi-
trailers, trailers and house trailers"33 (emphasis added). Therefore,
besides other possible classifications previously discussed, a mobile
home is a "motor vehicle. '34
Create a Security Interest
After selecting the proper classification for a mobile home, the
next step is to create a security interest.
The term "security interest" denotes a creditor's contractual
interest in personal property or fixtures which secures the debtor's
payment or performance of his obligation.3" Creation of the security
interest gives the secured party valuable rights as between the par-
ties themselves and in regard to third persons .3 Two statutes govern
the creation of an enforceable security interest. Section 87A-9-204
29. Cascade Electric Co. v. Associated Creditors, 124 Mont. 370, 224 P.2d 146, 149
(1950). Accord, Story Gold Dredging Co. v. Wilson, 106 Mont. 166, 76 P.2d 73, 78 (1938).
30. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-302(1)(d).
31. See, cases cited supra, note 12.
32. R.C.M. 1947, tit, 53.
33. In other contexts assorted types of mobile homes have been variously defined:
R.C.M. 1947, § 69-2105(14) "mobile home," R.C.M. 1947, § 69-2105(15) "recreational vehi-
cle;" R.C.M. 1947, § 84-6601(1) "mobile home;" R.C.M. 1947, § 84-6601(2) "house trailer."
34. Other jurisdictions defining a mobile home as a motor vehicle include: Nebraska
(In re Merril, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 755 (Ref. Dec. D. Neb. 1971), New York (Albany Discount
Corp. v. Mohawk Nat'l Bank, supra note 12), Michigan (In re Radny, supra note 12), and
Virginia (In re Canter, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 252 (Ref. Dec. E.D. Tenn. 1970). Wyoming does
not classify a mobile home as a motor vehicle. OPINION OF ArTORNEY GENERAL OF WYOMING,
No. 65, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 671 (August 12, 1963).
35. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 87A-1-201 (37), 87A-9-102.
36. See, R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-201 and U.C.C. § 9-201, Comment (1962 version).
[Vol. 36
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determines when a security interest attaches and section 87A-9-203
determines when it becomes enforceable. 87A-9-204 provides:
A security interest cannot attach until there is agreement ... that
it attach and value is given and the debtor has rights in the collat-
eral. It attaches as soon as all of the events in the preceding sent-
ence have taken place unless explicit agreement postpones the
time of attaching.
The statute requires an agreement for security. Apparently either
an oral or written agreement will suffice. Also, value must be given,
which occurs when the lender makes a binding promise to loan
money.37 Finally, the debtor must have "rights in the collateral,"
which are the contract rights he acquires when he enters into a
contract with a dealer for the purchase of a mobile home.38
There is a distinction between a security interest which has
"attached" and one that is "enforceable." A security interest may
attach without a writing, but for a security interest to be enforceable
against the debtor or third parties, it is necessary either that the
secured party possess the mobile home or that the parties enter into
a written security agreement. 9 Possible anomalous results can be
avoided by reducing the security agreement to writing.
The Code requires the security agreement to contain a descrip-
tion which reasonably identifies the particular mobile home. 0 The
agreement must also indicate that the secured party gave value and
that the debtor acquired rights in the mobile home.4' Further, it
must be signed by the debtor," and under federal law, adequate
Truth-in-Lending disclosures must be made.43
37. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-1-201(44)(a).
38. In re Pelletier, supra note 12 at 337.
39. This situation has arisen in New York. In Recchio v. Manufacturers & Traders Co.,
286 N.Y.S.2d 390, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1133 (Sup. Ct. 1968) plaintiff delivered possession of
a mobile home to a buyer under an oral agreement that the buyer would assume the payments
and upon final payment ownership would be transferred to her. The court disregarded the
anomaly between attached and enforceable security interests, holding this interest to be
enforceable. On appeal the court reinstated the distinction between attached and enforceable
security interests and reversed the lower court's ruling. Recchio v. Manufacturers & Traders
Co., 316 N.Y.S.2d 915, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 565 (App. Div. 1970). Section 9-203 of the 1972
version of the Code incorporates section 9-204 so that the security interest attaches when it
becomes enforceable, thus doing away with the distinction mentioned. U.C.C. § 9-203 (1972
version).
40. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 87A-9-203(1)(b), 87A-9-110.
41. See, notes 37 and 38 supra. A real estate mortgage which includes fixtures drafted
in light of real eastate law and Code language can suffice as a security agreement. George v.
Commercial Credit Corp., supra note 25. However, certain disadvantages are apparent. The
most obvious is that if the home is used as the debtor's residence the debtor is entitled to
possession for one year after foreclosure. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-5841.
42. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-203.
43. Truth in Lending Act, May 29, 1968, P.L. 90-321, §§ 101 to 114, 82 Stat. 146. For
1975]
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Perfect the Security Interest
Once a security interest is created, the secured party should
maximize his protection by taking the necessary steps to perfect his
interest. There are three methods to perfect a security interest: (1)
filing a financing statement; (2) retaining possession of the collat-
eral; or (3) doing nothing." The appropriate route is determined by
the particular classification assigned to the collateral.
Section 87A-9-302 provides the method of perfection to be used
with each classification. Section 87A-9-302(1) requires that a fi-
nancing statement be filed to perfect all security interests except
the following:
(a) a security interest in collateral in possession of the secured
party under 87A-9-305;
(d) a purchase money security interest in consumer goods; but
filing is required for a fixture under section 87A-9-313 or for a
motor vehicle required to be licensed.
Since the mobile home financer does not usually retain posses-
sion of the collateral, most transactions will involve perfection of
mobile home security interests pursuant to subsection (d).
Certainly a mobile home is a "motor vehicle" which must be
licensed. 45 Therefore, there must be a filing to perfect a security
interest in the mobile home. Generally, a financing statement is
filed in the location specified in section 87A-9-401.11 However, Mon-
tana has certificate of title laws covering motor vehicles, and trans-
actions covered by such laws are exempt from the Code's filing
requirement. 7 Thus, perfection of a security interest in a motor
vehicle is accomplished only by filing the security agreement with
forms complying with Truth in Lending requirements, see, 1 TRUTH IN LENDING MANUAL
1.01 et seq. (3d ed. R. Clontz, Jr. 1973).
44. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A.9-302.
45. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-302(1)(d).
46. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-401 provides that the proper place to file in order to perfect
a security interest is as follows:
(a) when the collateral is . . . consumer goods, then in the office of the county
clerk and recorder in the county of the debtor's residence or if the debtor is not a
resident of this state then in the office of the county clerk and recorder in the county
where the goods are kept...
(b) when the collateral is goods which at the time the security interest attaches
are or are to become fixtures, then in the office where a mortgage on the real estate
concerned would be filed or recorded;
(c) in all other cases, in the office of the secretary of state.
The formal requisites of a financing statement are found at R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-402.
47. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-302(3)(b).
[Vol. 36220
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the registrar of motor vehicles.4" This exclusive method of perfecting
security interests in motor vehicles is significant, as illustrated by
the following example. An automobile could be classified as a "con-
sumer good," "inventory" or "equipment" depending on its use.
But filing in a place other than with the registrar of motor vehicles
would be ineffective for purposes of perfecting a security interest in
the automobile. 9 The same reasoning ought to apply where the
collateral is classified as a fixture but is defined as a motor vehicle
for perfection purposes. For instance, if a mobile home becomes so
attached to the land that state law regards it as a fixture, it appears
that perfection of a security interest in the home should be accom-
plished merely by filing with the registrar of motor vehicles. How-
ever, there is authority10 indicating that if a mobile home becomes
a fixture, it loses its status as a motor vehicle and perfection can
only be established through filing a financing statement with the
county clerk and recorder in the county where the home is situated.5'
As one judge stated:
The trustee . . . errs when he asserts that the effect of the Motor
Vehicle Code . . . is to foreclose the possibility of a mobile home
ever becoming a fixture. The trustee points principally to (9-
304(4)) which states in relevant part 'The method provided in this
chapter of perfecting and giving notice of security interest subject
to this chapter is exclusive. . . .' Rather than accepting a restric-
tive interpretation of the Motor Vehicle Code, we feel that the
quoted provision, along with the other sections dealing with regis-
tration perfection of security interest [footnote omitted] do not
apply to a mobile home, once it has become a fixture. 2
Filing as to fixtures would give persons searching real property titles
notice of fixture interests, which is consistent with the Code's pur-
pose in requiring fixture filing.0 One writer, however, believes that
48. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-302(4). R.C.M. 1947, § 53-110 requires a copy of the security
agreement certified by a notary public to be filed with the registrar of motor vehicles. Note
that a financing statement is not filed.
49. U.C.C. § 9-302, Comment 8 (1962 version).
50. George v. Commercial Credit Corp., supra note 25 at 554; In re Vinarsky, supra note
12 at 710; Albany Discount Corp. v. Mowhawk Nat'l Bank, supra note 12 at 810; OPINION OP
THE ArroRNEY GENaAL OF KENTUCKY, No. 64-267, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 194 (March 25, 1964).
51. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-401(b). See text supra note 46. R.C.M. 1947, § 73-110 provides
that any instrument affecting title to real property be filed with the county clerk and recorder
in the county where the real estate is located. This filing will be hereinafter referred to as
fixture filing.
52. George v. Commercial Credit Corp., supra note 25 at 554.
53. U.C.C. § 9-401, Comment 2 (1962 version). Note that R.C.M. 1947, § 53-110(c)
states that filing with the registrar of motor vehicles is constructive notice to subsequent
encumbrancers. It is doubtful the legislature contemplated real estate encumbrancers when
drafting this section.
1975l
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once the security interest is perfected by filing with the registrar of
motor vehicles, that perfection should continue even though the
home becomes a fixture.54 The solution, of course, is to file in two
places: (1) file the security agreement with the registrar of motor
vehicles in Deer Lodge, and (2) file a financing statement with the
county clerk and recorder in the county where the mobile home
rests. "To the secured creditor double filing is a nuisance, but no
more than a nuisance.
55
POTENTIAL RISKS ASSUMED BY THE SECURED PARTY
A secured party with a perfected security interest in a mobile
home may be defeated by certain interests arising outside the Code
of which he is unaware. A good example is a lien.
Statutory liens are excluded from chapter 9 of the Code, except
where section 87A-9-310 grants them priority. Section 87A-9-310
provides:
When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes
services or materials with respect to goods subject to a security
interest, a lien upon goods in the possession of such person given
by statute or rule of law for such materials or services takes priority
over a perfected security interest unless the lien is statutory and
the statute expressly provides otherwise.
Unpaid workmen who have installed a mobile home or con-
nected utilities to it might seek to assert either a mechanic's 6 or a
possessory57 lien. These liens, if valid, are prior to any perfected
security interest in the mobile home. 58
A valid mechanic's lien is established where the materials sup-
plied or labor performed relate to something which has become
attached to and therefore a part of the realty. 9 Thus, the validity
of the mechanic's liens depends on whether the mobile home is a
fixture. If a mobile home becomes a fixture and a valid mechanic's
lien is created, the lien is prior to both antecedent or subsequent
security interests.
A possessory lien may be created if the mobile home retains its
character as personalty.8 0 However, as the name of the lien suggests,
54. R. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 8-4
(1973).
55. BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE, I SECURED TRANSACTIONS 511 (1963).
56. R.C.M. 1947, § 45-501.
57. R.C.M. 1947, § 45-1106.
58. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 45-504, 45-506, 45-1106.
59. Cascade Electric Co. v. Associated Creditors, supra note 29 at 150. Cf. Barnes v.
Montana Lumber etc. Co., 67 Mont. 481, 216 P. 335, 336 (1923); 57 C.J.S. Mechanics Lien §
21(1948).
60. R.C.M. 1947, § 45-1106.
[Vol. 36
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the workman must retain possession of the mobile home to establish
a valid lien. Usually the unpaid workmen will not retain possession
of a mobile home and so no lien will arise. In the unlikely case that
possession is retained, a valid lien could be established and section
87A-9-310 would grant the lienor priority over any perfected security
interest in the home.
A third type of lien is a landlord's lien which is created pur-
suant to a lease agreement.' A mobile home located on leased prop-
erty may be subject to a landlord's lien which attaches if the home
owner defaults in rent payments. 2 However, landlord's liens are
expressly excluded from chapter 9 of the Code. 3 Priority of such a
lien is determined under R.C.M. 1947, Section 45-201, which pro-
vides: "Other things being equal, different liens upon the same
property have priority according to their creation." Thus, it appears
the secured party, if he has perfected his security interest first, is
prior to a landlord's interest in the mobile home.
Should the mobile home become affixed to the realty, a security
interest in it, perfected by fixture filing, takes prior to: "(1) a credi-
tor with a prior encumbrance or record on the real estate . . .; (2)
a creditor with a lien on the real estate subsequently obtained by
judicial proceedings; and, (3) a subsequent purchaser for value of
an interest in the real estate." 4 Without fixture filing, the secured
party risks losing his priority over each of these creditors.
A mobile home may sustain a homestead where it is affixed to
the land. 5 As a general rule homesteads are not liable for the debts
of the holder of the homestead rights.66 However, there are excep-
tions: "The homestead is subject to execution or forced sale in satis-
faction of judgments obtained . . . (4) on debts secured by mort-
gages on the premises, executed and recorded before the declaration
homestead was filed for record."" It could be reasonably argued that
the above exception to the homestead exemption protects a secured
party who has perfected his interest by fixture filing before the
owner files for a homestead. But the secured party's rights on de-
fault are limited, since a judgment must be obtained as a prerequis-
ite to sale.
61. Barth v. Ely, 85 Mont. 310, 278 P.2d 1002, 1005 (1929). See also, R.C.M. 1947, §
45-110.
62. Barth v. Ely, supra note 61.
63. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-104(b). White and Summers argue that by negative implica-
tion of section 9-104(j), landlord's liens are included to the extent section 9-313 governs their
priority. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMEms, supra note 13 at § 25-10.
64. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-313(4).
65. 40 AM.JUR.2d Homestead § 30 (1968).
66. R.C.M. 1947, § 33-129.
67. R.C.M. 1947, § 33-105(4).
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If a lender seeks a security interest in a mobile home which is
already part of a homestead, a waiver of the owner's homestead
rights ought to be obtained."8
Some of a secured party's collateral may be lost where built-in
components are replaced. For example, if a local appliance dealer
replaces a built-in stove in a mobile home, taking a purchase money
security interest in the replacement, his interest is prior to an ante-
cedent perfected security interest in the mobile home. 9 However,
this loss is minor in comparison to the total value of the collateral.
CONCLUSION
By now a potential mobile home financer ought to be aware of
several important factors which merit his consideration. First, the
financer should determine the Code classification of the home by
inquiring as to how the debtor intends to use the mobile home,
where he intends to install it, and what interest he has in the land
where it is to be installed. In order to avoid enforcement difficulties,
the agreement for security should be reduced to writing. To insure
maximum protection, the creditor's security interest should be per-
fected by filing as to motor vehicles and fixtures. Also, the secured
party ought to obtain lien and homestead waivers wherever appro-
priate. These suggestions are intended to supplement current prac-
tice to afford maximum protection for the mobile home financer. Of
course a financer's best protection is his credit policy. A solid lend-
ing practice minimizes defaults and the need for legal action.
The law has always maintained a conservative lag behind social
and technical developments. Perhaps this is the time for the legisla-
ture to establish the proper relationship of the mobile home to the
Code, if only to clarify its classification.
68. R.C.M. 1947, § 33-106. Note, general waivers of the homestead exemption are void.
But where a person encumbers his homestead knowing the results of surrendering his home-
stead rights, he waives the exemption. United States Bldg. etc. Assn. v. Stevens, 93 Mont.
11, 17 P.2d 62, 65 (1932).
69. R.C.M. 1947, § 87A-9-314(1).
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